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Introduction
In much of the world, money and scarce organizational talent are being used to help reduce fertility. This paper explores some of the issues involved in evaluating voluntary family planning programs that seek to achieve a reduction in fertility by extending (i) informatien about birth control, (ii) services to adopt methods of birth control, and (iii) contraceptive supplies to continue using these methods. Evaluation of population policies involves dealing with three questions: (1) for a given level of effort, which of the possible program designs is preferable? (2) This paper outlines approaches for answering only the first two questions and illustrates their application. Answering these first questions provides the framework needed to consider the third. But it is difficult to assign a comprehensive _monetary benefit to the achievement of the objective of a family planning program--averting an unwanted birth--just as it is difficult to evaluate in strictly monetary terms most other social welfare programs.
Consequently, this paper focuses on measuring the cost-effectiveness of -programs and the distribution of that effect, and leaves to others the controversial task of assessing the cost-benefit ratio of a family planning program (National Research Council, 1986 ).
Evaluation Based on Intermediate Objectives
Initially, family planning advocates assumed that if information about *Prepared for the Journal of Policy Modeling, Special Issue on Population Growth and Economic Development, edited by Dominick Salvatore. Partial support of NICHD grant No. HD-20505 is acknowledged.
-3-The motivation of the program adopter to regulate their fertility may stem not only from variation in fecundity, but also from unexplained variation in desired fertility. Consequently, heterogeneity in preferences will also lead to a self-selection bias in the composition of program acceptors. In either case, the program adopter is more likely than the average couple to search out a method privately and use it relatively effectively had there been no public family planning program. The intensity of motivation, because it is not "held constant" in such comparisons, will tend to overstate the net effectiveness of the program. In other words, the program services substitute in part for birth control methods that would otherwise have been obtained from the private marketplace. The number of additional births averted by the program is, in this case, less than the full contraceptive effectiveness of the methods adopted and supplied within the program.
To assess the magnitude of this substitution of public for private sector services, more elaborate case-control matching studies are sometimes designed.
Their objective is to compare the subsequent fertility of a group of women (or couples) accepting some form of birth control in the program with a control group who has not entered the program, matched by such characteristics as age, education, number of births, and time since last birth (Chang and Chow, 1969) .
Though undoubtedly an improvement over evaluation based on program services alone, the ma~~qing case-control approach is costiy, time consuming, and is not free of motivational bias, whether it arises from variation in fecundity (supply) or desired fertility (demand).
Finally, programs probably contribute to the general availability of information about family planning, and thereby influence the reproductive behavior of some couples to obtain improved methods of birth control from sources outside of the program. On this score, the matching methodology, even /u/lv/MsFamPlan 8/25/87 -4-if it were purged of the self selection bias (Heckman, 1979 (Heckman, , 1987 , would understate the family planning program's effect on fertility, because of the spillover due to information diffusion. There is no simple way to assess how these various sources of bias balance out in each specific instance.di
Evaluation Based on Fertility Effects
The only way to avoid these unresolved problems of translating the adoption of family planning services into births prevented is to analyze directly the program's final objective--fertility. Reduction of birth rates is thus the .least uncertain criteria by which to evaluate a family planning program.
Nonetheless, there are also problems of measurement and comparative analysis with this approach.
First, a family planning program may assist parents in switching from one to another means of birth c9ntrol, leaving birth rates potentially unchanged.
For example, before a program is initiated, many couples may resort to coitus interruptus, continence, marital dissolution, frigidity, and induced abortion to avert unwanted births, while after a program has been initiated couples may instead acquire and use modern techniques of birth control. The program objective, narrowly defined, may not have been advanced, yet clearly there·has been a private and social gain. This benefit is neglected here.
Second, parents may benefit from a program by learning of new methods of birth control without necessarily putting them to use immediately. Since family planning is largely avoiding unwanted births after having achieved the number of children desired (not spacing births), young parents upon learning about the availability of more reliable means of birth control may not seek to reduce their current birth rate. On the contrary, young parents may even /u/lv/MsFamPlan 8/25/87 -5-concentrate their child rearing in their younger years, as was common in many industrially advanced countries after the Second World War, because they knew how reliably to avoid additional pregnancies later in their lives. Although a family planning program could reduce the completed cohort fertility of today's younger woman, it might also shorten early birth intervals and increase birth rates for young women. Without the time to construct and analyze the preferable longitudinal cohort data that permits program evaluation to focus on long-run impact on completed fertility, reproductive behavior of women of different ages should be analyzed carefully. Evidence of different short-run program effects on different age cohorts should, therefore, be interpreted cautiously, for birth rate changes among younger women may be a result of offsetting changes in the length of birth intervals and the total number of children these women will eventually bear.~ Regardless of these weaknesses, the capacity of a family planning program to reduce birth rates appears to be the most satisfactory single criteria of program success. But a simple objective does_not make evaluation simple. Only by statistical inference can the relationship between program inputs and birth rates be established, and statistical inference depends on the availability of data and the realism of working assumptions. The modeling problem of population program evaluation reduces to one of discovering the exogenous factors that explain variation in individual or aggregate fertility in the absence of the family planning program, and measuring variation in these factors and program activity across the population. The independence of these two factors is not always satisfied in reality, and thus the need to control for environmental influences on fertility in order to evaluate the effect of family planning program activity.
/u/lv/MsFamPlan 8/25/87 -6-There ,are many exogenous constraints that influence fertility in any particular setting: Wi, Pi, Bi, Ii, e1i) (1) The crucial working hypothesis is that sample variation in family planning activity, Ii,is not systematically allocated across types of communities in such a way as to be correlated with the residual error eli· Nonrandom allocation of program activity might arise in two circumstances. Family planning activity may be promoted in, say, poor communities that lack private medical services. Alternatively, individuals with unusually strong preferences for a small family size and who are hence particularly motivated to control their fertility may tend to migrate to regions better served by family planning programs, because they demand these services. The latter possibility can, I
suspect, be neglected, because family planning services are a sufficiently small share of expenditures to have only a minor effect on the direction of migration. The former possibility could be important, but would depend on the particular country, legislative mandate, and program implementation.Q/ /u/lv/MsFamPlan 8/25/87 -7-Several determinants of fertility are stressed most frequently in the literature on the economic determinants of fertility (Schultz, 1976) : (1) household wealth and (2) community income earning opportunities of the males (both are positive factors on fertility in most traditional, predominantly rural societies), (3) community wage opportunities available to women for work and their education (both negative factors), (4) wage opportunities in the community or the marginal product in the household of unskilled child labor (positive), (5) environmental conditions in the community that contribute to a higher level of child mortality (positive), (6) higher return in the community to child schooling and availability of schools that contribute to a higher enrollment rate among childrenZ/ (negative), and (7) of the target population's current knowledge of birth control methods.
Empirical studies have not yet explored these issues in great detail, however.
In the first years of the Taiwan program examined here, the cumulative sum of past local activity explained fertility nearly as well as including all previous years as separate regressors, suggesting depreciation of "knowledge"
is not yet very important (Schultz, 197la, 1973 Potter, 1983) . This distributed lag relationship should vary for birth rates of women of different ages (Schultz, 197la, b) , because fecundity and hence interbirth intervals vary in noncontracepting populations by age. It is anticipated, therefore, that the lag between a change in an economic constraint or program variable and fertility will differ according to the age of a woman. · Most constraint and even program variables tend to be smoothly trended (for .example, wage and schooling differentials across· communities) and provide relatively little information for estimating these distributed lag structures.
The exception is child mortality,_ where epidemics can cause unusual, partially exogenous, fluctuations from year to year, and from region to region. One to four year distrib'uted lag relationships between child mortality and the birth rate of women of different ages can be clearly discerned in the published regional data for Taiwan. A three year discrete lag is adopted here (Schultz, 1971a) .
As data become available on a cross section of communities over time, the time series variation within communities can also be analyzed. Eventually cross sections and time series are pooled under various statistical assumptions about the errors in the fertility determining equation (Schultz, 1973) . The Specifically, in a linear approximation of the fertility equation:
where all nonprogram constraints are combined in the Xi vector, and 11 and I2
refer to the two field workers. The independent effect of the fieldworkers is expected to be negative, a3, a4 < 0, and the effect of the product of their work activity is hypothesized to be positive, as > 0.
A lesson learned over the last two decades by family planning managers in different countries is that the success of family planning depends heavily on /u/lv/MsFamPlan 8/25/87
the underlying changes in the economic and social environment which motivate couples to "demand" fewer births. There is no reason to expect "excess demand"
for contraception, for which the program is a response, to be equally strong in all segments of the population. Moreover, statistics generated within programs on adoption of services may not reflect accurately these demands, if substitution from the private market to the public program is greater in some strata of the society than in others. For example, rural-agricultural regions might continue to value many children for their unskilled labor on family farms
and not be motivated to use nontraditional forms of birth control. Not only would these agricultural regions exhibit higher fertility, the interaction of proportion in agriculture and family planning activity would be in this case positive.
The opposite situation might occur if agricultural mechanization were under way and the migration out of agriculture encourages. parents to restrict abruptly their fertility and invest more in their children's schooling in order for these children to qualify for city jobs. Since it is common for rural communities to be poorly served by the private modern medical system, and thus rural residents may have a particularly hard time evaluating alternative modern means of birth control and adopting family planning in a timely fashion. The reproductive response to local family planning activity under this scenario might be stronger in rural-agricultural regions ·than in urban areas, leading to a negative effect of the interaction of the proportion in agriculture and program variables as they impact on fertility.
Another hypothesis that. can be tested with individual data postulates that education of the adopter and extension activity that facilitates adoption are regressive with respect to income) would be taken into account in addition to calcu~ating more precisely the aggregate effectiveness of the program in reducing the birth rate.
In the prior example, suppose it was primarily the highly educated urban elite who had "excess demands" for family planning, and the program had to expend twice as much of its resources to avert a birth among the poor, less educated segments of the population. This evidence could lead to a more realistic appraisal of the costs of reaching the poor and disadvantaged within the currently designed program. It might lead to the adoption of new program /u/lvjMsFamPlan 8/25/87 -13-design, such as one that stressed outreach field workers for rural areas, rather than a clinic-based design that achieved its objectives efficiently for urban areas. Unless a public sector intervention program can be shown to serve more than a narrow urban elite, it would lose its claim to be a redistributive and progressive component of broadly based social welfare programs.
5. An Em. 
.... -17-When each input has diminishing marginal productivity, a basic rule of · economics is that costs per unit of output are minimized by selecting the mix of inputs at which the marginal value products of all inputs are equalized. In other words, the family planning program manager should be searching for a situation where the last dollar spent on any input yields the same decline in birth rates. But Table 2 -18-control was adopted.ill It can be speculated that the decision made to increase program employment of PPHWs (and decrease program employment of VHENs) was made with access only to the referral information from the first few years of program operation. The sharply contrasting image of the relative effectiveness of field staff emerges her~ only when a broader indicator of program "success" is adopted--namely, the program's contribution to reducing the actual birth rate.
Distribution of Program Effects
In the case of Taiwan, my evaluation of the family planning program relied on published data in the form of regional aggregated birth rates, which do not permit the researcher to interact individual characteristics of the couple collected from a random household survey or census with the local levels of program activity. However, more limited regional interactions of environmental and averaged individual variables suggest that the Taiwan family planning program was distinctly more effective in reducing birth rates in (1) predominantly agricultural regions, (2) regions that exhibited low child mortality, and (3) regions that had a high proportion of children already in school (Schultz, 197la ).
An analysis of a Colombian Census sample from 1973 and municipality data suggests that the education of the woman interacted with the municipal level of family planning activity has a positive effect on children ever born, while both variables exert the anticipated negative direct effect on children ever born (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982) . This interaction effect is statistically significant, however, only among urban women between the ages of 25 to 34 who stood a substantial chance of benefiting from the national program that had fertility is an important topic for population policy research. Oddly, it is not discussed in recent surveys of the field (Lapham and Simmons, 1987) .
Policy Conclusions and Their Limitations
In such an important ar~a as population policy, it is disconcerting that different approaches to evaluating family planning interventions can yield different conclusions with regard to the overall impact of the program, changes in returns to the scale of program activity, and the relative effectiveness of various classes of workers. More economic and demographi~ research is needed to confirm the reasons for why these differences in policy conclusions occur.
Recent global reviews of the state of knowledge about the effectiveness of family planning do not refer to these ambiguities of evaluation methodologies or to the policy problems they imply (Lapham and Simmons, 1987) . Some regional analyses of family planning, however, do explore the limitations of current evaluation methods (Palmore, 1987) . The approach reviewed here observes births directly and controls for the major fertility determinants that are assumed to be exogen_ous to a couple when it makes its life plans as to the number of children it desires and the amount it wants to invest in each child's health and education. Unbiased estimates of the average, and more important, the marginal effects of program activities on birth rates can then be inferred from these data. The inferences for policy drawn from this methodology can differ from those derived from other widely used demographic approaches to family planning evaluation. The Taiwan To what extent can public policies change these prices that face the family and thereby foster changes in fertility? The final contribution of direct and indirect population policies still remains to be documented, and their side effects, both good and bad, have not been adequately assessed. This information is needed to enable society to make an intelligent choice of the policies that are most equitable in narrowing any identified divergence between private and social interests in having children (National Research Council, 1986 The belief that parents are ignorant of, and indifferent to, all methods for controlling their fertility .has justified in the past a heavy reliance on technological solutions to the population problem via investments in contraceptive technology. Although it is undoubtedly true that rapid population growth in the world today is in part a consequence of our unperfected methods of birth control, it is also true that this basic technological shortcoming is less important than it is often assumed.
Fundamentally, the problem is social; parents want many more children than are now needed to replace themselves.13/ This is not to minimize the difficult task The conclusion was drawn that programs should improve knowledge, and thereby lead to increased practice of modern birth control, fewer unwanted births, and much lower fertility levels. Controversy continues to surround subjective measures of "unwanted births" (Berelson, 1971) . Monitoring the prevalence of contraceptive use then became the central issue, and remains the basic management tool in family planning (Freedman and Takeshita, 1969; Lapham and Mauldin, 1985; Lapham and Simmons, 1987 ). The more difficult task of measuring the role of family planning in actually reducing fertility has not yet led to a consensus on suitable evaluation methods (Hermalin, 1975, Mauldin and Berelson, 1978; Palmore, 1987 -27-21For example, calculations may be made on how long the IUD is likely to remain in place for the average woman served by the program and how effective they are in this period in preventing births (Potter, 1971) . There are always differences in the clinical effectiveness rates and those achieved in a mass program. Moreover, the problem of self selection of users m~y add various forms of bias Schultz, 1985, 1987) , as discussed later.
11There are also other problems with interpretation of service records for overall program ~valuation. In many programs there are monetary incentives built into the administration scheme to motivate field workers and doctors to help the largest number of persons possible. Though this common procedure is complemented in the Taiwan program by appropriate safeguards to assure records are accurate, it seems nevertheless likely that these incentives will introduce some bias into service statistics. ·In other countries this bias may be large, Ryder (1971) Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986) in the context of Colombia where inmigration from rural areas to the suburban sampled area was substantial.
They were unable, however, to deal with the effect of outmigration from their highly mobile population or treat fully the factors influencing the rates of inmigration to their community.
llTo interpret the seemingly general association for the purposes of formulating policy, information is required on what determines interregional differences in school attendance rates. Is it the limited capacity of the school system or, in other words, the supply of schooling that is restricting /u/lv/MsFamPlanNo 8/24/87 -29-attendance? Or is it the reluctance of parents to send their children to receive basic education, and thus a lack of demand for schooling that determines the interregional variation in school attendance rates? I believe the more plausible assumption for Taiwan in the 1960s is that the capacity of the school system, particularly in rural areas, generally constrained the acceptance of students and accounted for much of the interregional variation in attendance rates. If this assumption is correct, and excess demand for schooling exists, a consequence of school expansion is likely to be a reduction in child labor force participation and a reduction in birth rates.
lVThe only empirical evidence I have discovered that sheds some light on the returns to scale in the Taiwan family planning program are those compiled and analyzed by John A. Ross (1966) to scale appear to be evident from the Taichung data Ross has studied, even though the measure of program output is regrettably limited to service statistics and not the program's final effect on fertility .
.2./The age standardized birth rate is the sum of the local female age specific birth rates weighted by the region's total population share of the specific female age group, divided by the national crude birth rate. The mean of the age standardized birth rate is thus approximately one. The regional female age specific birth rates are also normalized to one by dividing them by the national age specific birth rate. See notes to Table 1 for other variable definitions in Taiwan. 1Q/For example, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) show that in Colombia £amily planning activity contributes to both a decline in fertility and a decline in child mortality. Thus, if child health and fertility are substitutes, then the inclusion of child mortality in the fertility equation is expected to reduce the partial regression coefficient on family planning activity. In Malaysia, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1987) again find evidence that an exogenous increase in their supply of births induce couples to educate their children less. This finding confirms that the Malaysian couples behav~ as though children and child schooling are substitutes, in which case the inclusion of child schooling in a fertility equation would bias down the estimated family planning program effect (i.e. an intervention that increases the implicit price of children by reducing the cost of avoiding an unwanted birth). Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) also use twins as an exogenous source of fertility variation to confirm that in a rural Indian sample parents react to a twin by reducing the schooling that they provide their other children. This is another indication that fertility and /u/lv/MsFa~PlanNo 8/24/87 -31-child schooling are substitutes. Finally, the effects of loc'al family planning, health, and educational programs on fertility and child mortality in India and the Philippines reported by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982) provide additional evidence for the patterns of cross price effects that are assumed here.
11/see, for example, Robinson's (1969) estimates suggested that the average cost of an IUD insertion did not rise markedly in the Taiwan program in the first several years of program expansion.
111As the program developed, doctors and health station workers increasingly gave "credit" for referrals to the local PPHW, for they recognized that this assignment of credit would help the PPHW reach her quota (and earn her financial bonuses) while having no effect on the status of VHENs (Freedman and Takeshita, 1969, pp. 316-317) . Because the bonus incentive payments were awarded to only one class of responsible personnel, these payments apparently introduced a bias in the referral information that was subsequently used in evaluating the program. For example, the PPHW referrals increased from 36 percent of the total in 1964 to 62 percent in 1968, whereas VHEN referrals fell from 7 to 3 percent in this period (Freedman and Takeshia, 1969, lJ.!An interesting example of this point is provided by Zimbabwe. An excellently implemented family planning program in that country has recently managed to increase a prevalence rate of contraception use among women of childbearing age to one-third. But the level of total fertility rates has not yet begun to· decrease noticeably from 6-8 children. Women report using modern birth control, but only to space births. They may be using these modern /u/lv/MsFamPlanNo 8/24/87 -32-techniques largely to replace more traditional ones, such as breastfeeding.
Nonetheless, the problem, if there is one, is that the vast majority of women in Zimbabwe want more children (Bohene and Dow, 1987) .
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